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address	 the	 issue	 of	 decolonial	 ethics.	 Decolonial	 ethics	 imagines	 a	 set	 of	
ethical	 orientations	 that	 confront	 conventional	 assumptions	 about	 culture	
and	 history	 and	 challenge	 the	 normally	 uninterrogated	 consequences	 of	
coloniality	(which	is	an	enduring	process	that	is	still	very	much	with	us	today,	
as	 opposed	 to	 colonialism	 which	 is	 understood	 as	 a	 temporal	 period	 of	
oppression	 that	 has	 come	 and	 gone)	 and	 Eurocentrism	 in	 disciplinary	








peace	 education,	 human	 rights	 education	 and	 citizenship	 education.	His	 recent	 books	
include:	Critical	 Human	 Rights	 Education:	 Advancing	 Social-Justice-Oriented	 Educational	
Praxes	(with	 A.	 Keet),	 and	Socially	 Just	 Pedagogies	 in	 Higher	 Education	(co-edited	 with	
V.	Bozalek,	R.	Braidotti,	and	T.	Shefer).	In	2016,	he	received	the	Distinguished	Researcher	









claimed	 an	 ethical	 mission	 that	 has	 attempted	 in	 the	 past	 to	 articulate	





different	path	 in	HRE	and	PE	 from	 the	 familiar	 ethical	 theories	along	 three	
directions:	border	thinking,	being	human	as	praxis,	and	pluriversality.	
	





how	 these	 maladies	 are	 implicated	 in	 un-critical,	 monolithic,	
depoliticized	 and	 largely	 de-contextualized	 manifestations	 of	 HRE	 and	 PE	
(e.g.	see	Bajaj,	2015;	Bajaj	&	Brantmeier,	2011;	Keet,	2015;	Kester,	2019;	Shirazi,	
2011;	Williams,	 2013,	 2016,	 2017;	 Yang,	 2015;	 Zakharia	 2017;	 Zembylas,	 2017a,	
2017b,	 2018).	 This	 work	 has	 drawn	 attention	 to	 a	 range	 of	 exclusions,	
epistemic	 injustices	and	other	violences	 in	HRE	and	PE,	and	 to	a	 failure	 to	
fully	address	issues	of	power,	race,	and	coloniality.	Some	of	the	critiques	and	
counter-projects	that	have	been	raised	against	coloniality	and	Eurocentrism	
draw	 inspiration	 from	 decolonial	 thinking,	 highlighting	 how	 a	 ‘colonial	




Torres	 (2007,	 2008),	 Sylvia	Wynter	 (2003;	Wynter	&	McKittrick,	 2015),	 and	
others,	have	turned	our	attention	to	the	deep	influence	of	taken-for-granted	
epistemological,	 ontological,	 	 methodological,	 and	 ethical	 assumptions	
embedded	 within	 academic	 disciplines,	 and	 particularly	 the	 determining	
force	of	historical	and	contemporary	relations	of	colonialism	and	coloniality	









decolonization	 in	 academia	 is	 the	 task	 of	 developing	 decolonial	 ethics	
(Dussel,	 1985,	 2013;	Maldonado-Torres,	 2007,	 2008).	 Decolonial	 ethics	 does	
not	 simply	 recognize	 the	 values	 of	 intercultural	 dialogue	 and	 cultural	
differences,	 as	 liberal,	 multiculturalist,	 and	 cosmopolitan	 orientations	
emphasize.	 Rather,	 decolonial	 ethics	 imagines	 a	 set	 of	 ethical	 orientations	
that	 confront	 conventional	 assumptions	 about	 culture	 and	 history	 and	
challenge	 the	 normally	 uninterrogated	 consequences	 of	 coloniality	 and	
Eurocentrism	in	disciplinary	discourses	and	practices.	In	this	sense,	the	task	
of	 developing	 a	 decolonial	 ethics	 is	 essentially	 a	 project	 of	 unworking	 the	
ethics	 of	 coloniality	 and	 Eurocentrism	 within	 disciplines	 (Odysseos,	 2017).	
Therefore,	 decolonial	 ethics	 is	 distinct	 from,	 and	 critical	 of,	 the	 ethics	




fundamental	 principles	 of	 Western	 notions	 such	 as	 ‘individualism’	 and	
‘universality’	 in	 favor	 of	 other	 values	 such	 as	 ‘border	 thinking’	 and	
‘pluriversality’	(Dunford,	2017).	Border	thinking	highlights	the	contributions	
of	 subaltern	 knowledge	 producers,	 who	 are	 in	 the	 ‘borders’	 or	 ‘margins,’	
whereas	 pluriversality	 emphasizes	 that	 there	 are	 pluriversal	 values,	 that	 is,	




address	 the	 question	 of	 decolonial	 ethics.	 However,	 as	 Odysseos	 (2017)	
emphasizes,	this	task	will	not	be	accomplished	by	“incorporating	elements	of	




new	 language	of	 ethics—a	 language	 that	moves	beyond	Eurocentric	 ethical	







imaginaries	 to	 the	 ethical	 problem	 of	 how	 to	 struggle	 against	 violations	 of	
rights	and	to	reinstate	respect	and	protection	of	rights	and	positive	peace	in	
the	world,	while	 coloniality	 still	 persists.	 Although	 both	HRE	 and	 PE	 have	
historically	 claimed	 an	 ethical	 mission	 that	 has	 attempted	 in	 the	 past	 to	
articulate	responses	to	the	ethical	problem	of	togetherness	in	the	world,	both	
conventional	and	even	more	progressive	approaches	 that	 fall	within	critical	
HRE	 and	 critical	 PE,	 have	 been	 generally	 unreflective	 about	 the	 ethical	
implications	of	coloniality	and	Eurocentrism	in	these	fields.	
This	 article	 seeks	 to	 outline	 some	 elements	 of	 a	 future	 decolonial	
ethics	 in	HRE	and	PE,	while	 showing	 the	 limits	of	 familiar	ethical	 theories,	
namely,	 liberal,	multiculturalist,	 and	 cosmopolitan	 orientations.	 The	 aim	 is	
not	to	provide	a	comprehensive	description	of	decolonial	ethics	in	HRE	and	
PE,	as	this	would	not	only	be	impossible,	but	it	would	risk	repeating	the	same	
colonizing	 moves	 that	 are	 driven	 by	 currently	 dominant	 ontological,	
epistemological	 and	 ethical	 investments	 in	 universality,	 certainty,	 and	
mastery	 (Stein,	 2019).	 As	 Dunford	 (2017)	 emphasizes,	 “an	 exhaustive	 and	
definitive	 statement	 of	 decolonial	 ethics	 […]	 would	 be	 impossible,	 for	
decolonial	ethics	has	emerged	from,	and	must	remain	open	to	being	shaped	





some	 general	 contours	 of	 decolonial	 critiques	 that	 highlight	 the	
distinctiveness	 of	 coloniality’s	 ethics.	 The	 second	 section	 shows	 how	 the	
ethics	 of	 coloniality	 is	 reflected	 in	 the	 engagement	with	 understandings	 of	
peace	and	human	rights	theories	and	pedagogies.	The	third	section	turns	to	
the	work	 of	 decolonial	 scholars	 Enrique	Dussel,	 Sylvia	Wynter	 and	Nelson	
Maldonado-Torres	 and	 critically	 engages	 with	 their	 ideas	 on	 decolonial	
ethics;	 in	particular,	my	analysis	addresses	 the	 idea	of	ethics	of	materiality,	
positionality	 and	 corporality,	 the	 critique	 of	 ethical	 subjectivity	 found	 in	









directions:	 border	 thinking,	 being	human	as	praxis,	 and	pluriversality.	This	
section	also	discusses	the	tensions	and	possibilities	emerging	from	attempts	
to	 develop	 a	 decolonial	 ethics	 in	HRE	 and	 PE,	 arguing	 that	 the	 project	 of	





and	 its	 aftermath—the	 coloniality	 of	 power	 and	 knowledge,	 land	
appropriation,	racial	hierarchization	and	exclusion,	liberal	individualism,	and	
claims	 of	 universality	 (e.g.	Dussel,	 2013;	Maldonado-Torres,	 2008;	Mignolo,	
2011;	 Quijano,	 2007;	Wynter,	 2003).1	Key	 to	 this	 ‘colonial	 matrix	 of	 power’	
(Quijano,	 2007)	 are	 particular	 Western	 values	 such	 as	 civilization,	
development	and	liberalism,	“that	have	been	imposed	on	others	as	universal	
and	 globally	 applicable	 designs”	 (Dunford,	 2017,	 p.	 382).	 As	 various	
decolonial	scholars	argued,	the	colonial	matrix	of	power	rested	on	the	racial	
classification	 of	 the	world,	 capitalism	 as	 a	 violent	mode	 of	 production,	 the	
exploitation	of	colonized	populations,	and	the	expropriation	of	non-Western	




1 It	 is	 important	 to	 clarify	 from	 the	 beginning	 that	 there	 are	 distinctive	 features	 that	
distinguish	decolonial	 theories	 from	postcolonialism	 and	other	 critical	 theories	 (Ndlovu-
Gatsheni,	2015).	A	similar	argument	has	been	made	in	the	field	of	education,	namely,	it	has	
been	argued	 that	decolonial	 and	postcolonial	perspectives	are	not	necessarily	 equivalent,	
complementary	 or	 even	 supplementary	 to	 critical	 theory	 and	 pedagogy	 projects	
(Gaztambide-Fernandez,	2012;	Tuck	&	Yang,	2012).	Discussing	these	theoretical	differences	
lies	 beyond	 the	 scope	 of	 this	 article.	 It	 is	 sufficient	 to	 say	 here	 that	 the	 decolonial	 turn	
encourages	 re-thinking	 the	world	 from	 the	perspective	of	 the	marginalized,	 that	 is,	 from	
Latin	 America,	 from	 Africa,	 from	 Indigenous	 places	 and	 from	 the	 global	 South.	 While	
postcolonial	theory—as	it	is	exemplified,	for	example,	in	the	work	of	Said	and	Spivak—has	
exposed	 Eurocentrism,	 decolonial	 theory	 presents	 a	 much	 more	 radical	 position	 that	









impossible	 to	 capture	 in	 this	 section	 the	 diversity	 and	 complexity	 of	
decolonial	 thinking,	 therefore,	 I	 will	 focus	 on	 outlining	 three	 general	
contours	 of	 decolonial	 critiques	 that,	 in	 my	 view,	 highlight	 the	
distinctiveness	of	coloniality’s	ethics:	coloniality	as	an	enduring	process	that	
claims	 the	 superiority	 of	 colonialism’s	 achievements;	 coloniality	 as	
constitutive	of	 liberal	values;	and,	coloniality	as	bound	up	with	Eurocentric	
knowledge	 and	 the	 epistemicide	 of	 colonized	 subjects’	 knowledge.	 This	
discussion	provides	vital	background	for	understanding	decolonial	ethics.	
First,	it	is	important	to	clarify	that	coloniality	in	general	refers	to	“the	
continuity	 of	 colonial	 forms	 of	 domination	 after	 the	 end	 of	 colonial	
administrations,	 produced	 by	 colonial	 cultures	 and	 structures	 in	 the	
modern/colonial	 capitalist/patriarchal	 world-system”	 (Grosfoguel,	 2007,	 p.	
219).	 In	 other	 words,	 coloniality	 is	 a	 political,	 economic,	 racial	 and	 ethical	
system	 of	 classification	 and	 domination.	 As	 Maldonado-Torres	 (2007)	
emphasizes,	 there	 is	 an	 important	 distinction	 between	 coloniality	 and	
colonialism:		
Coloniality	 is	 different	 from	 colonialism.	 Colonialism	 denotes	 a	
political	and	economic	relation	in	which	the	sovereignty	of	a	nation	
or	a	people	rests	on	the	power	of	another	nation,	which	makes	such	
nation	 an	 empire.	 Coloniality,	 instead,	 refers	 to	 long-standing	
patterns	of	power	 that	 emerged	as	 a	 result	of	 colonialism,	but	 that	
define	 culture,	 labor,	 intersubjective	 relations,	 and	 knowledge	
production	well	beyond	the	strict	limits	of	colonial	administrations.	
Thus,	 coloniality	 survives	 colonialism.	 It	 is	 maintained	 alive	 in	
books,	in	the	criteria	for	academic	performance,	in	cultural	patterns,	
in	common	sense,	in	the	self-image	of	peoples,	in	aspirations	of	self,	
and	 so	many	other	 aspects	 of	 our	modern	 experience.	 In	 a	way,	 as	
modern	 subjects	we	breathe	 coloniality	 all	 the	 time	 and	 every	day.	
(p.	243)	
The	main	point	here	is	that	coloniality	is	an	enduring	process	that	claims	the	
superiority	 of	 colonialism’s	 achievements	 and	 the	 inferiority	 of	 conquered	
populations—hence,	the	colonial	matrix	of	power	invokes	a	particular	system	
of	 ethics.	 For	 example,	 the	 coloniality	 of	 power—manifested	 through	 the	










of	 naturalizing	 violence	 and	 slavery	 justified	 by	 virtue	 of	 the	 conquered	
populations’	‘race.’	
Second,	 coloniality	 is	 constitutive	 of	 liberal	 values	 and	 Western	
democratic	 political	 institutions	 (Dunford,	 2017).	 As	 Maldonado-Torres	
(2007)	writes	about	Mignolo’s	(2003)	notion	of	coloniality	as	‘the	darker	side	
of	modernity’:	
Modernity,	 usually	 considered	 to	 be	 a	 product	 of	 the	 European	




Modern	discourses	of	 liberal	 rights,	 in	particular	 rights	 to	private	property,	
can	 be	 traced	 in	 the	 politics	 of	 colonialism	 and	 the	 economic	 growth	 of	
Europe	 enabled	 by	 colonialism	 that	 has	 led	 to	 a	 wider	 distribution	 of	
property	(Jahn,	2013).	As	Ndlovu-Gatsheni	(2013)	explains:	
The	 darker	 or	 underside	 of	 modernity	 included	 the	 slave	 trade,	
fratricidal	 colonial	wars	of	 conquest,	negative	development,	 violent	
civilizing	missions,	forcible	Christianization,	material	dispossessions	
and	other	forms	of	violence.	The	brighter	side	of	modernity	included	
the	 flowering	 of	 individual	 liberties,	 universal	 suffrage,	 mass	
democracy,	secularization	and	emancipation	of	the	masses	from	the	
tyranny	 of	 tradition	 and	 religion,	 rationality	 and	 scientific	 spirit,	
popular	 education,	 technology	 and	 many	 other	 accomplishments	
(Boron,	2005,	p.	32).	But	for	one	to	experience	the	darker	or	brighter	
aspects	 of	 modernity	 depended	 on	 which	 side	 of	 the	 abyssal	 lines	
one	was	 located	 as	 well	 as	 the	 racial	 category	 into	 which	 one	was	
classified.	(p.	25)	
Needless	 to	 say,	 the	 so-called	 ‘brighter	 side	 of	 modernity’	 is	 not	 without	
caveats.	 Individual	 liberties	 come	 sometimes	 at	 the	 cost	 of	 collective	






assumed	emancipation	of	 tradition	and	religion	 is	 leading	 to	 Islamophobia;	
popular	education	assumes	that	other	types	of	education	are	not	relevant.2	In	
short,	 coloniality	 is	 inextricably	 linked	 to	 liberal-democratic	 values	 and	
institutions	 in	 Europe,	 hence	 the	 ethico-political	 foundations	 of	 European	
values—e.g.	private	property,	 tolerance,	multiculturalism,	cosmopolitanism,	
individual	 rights,	 human	 rights	 and	 so	 on—were	 borne	 out	 of	 the	 colonial	
experience.	As	De	Lissovoy	(2010)	points	out,	the	principle	of	coexistence	is	a	
fundamental	 ethical	 value	 of	 coloniality	 “in	 which	 the	 radical	 differences	
between	hegemonic	and	indigenous	standpoints	are	not	suppressed”	(p.	282).	
However,	 the	 hypocrisy	 is	 that	 coexistence	 is	 manifested	 through	 “the	
appropriation	of	indigenous	lands,	resources,	knowledge	and	culture	within	a	
colonial	 dynamic”	 (De	 Lissovoy,	 p.	 282).	 For	 example,	 the	 ideals	 of	 peace,	
democracy	and	human	rights	that	are	dominant	in	the	twenty-first	century,	
have	 all	 been	 imposed	 by	 violence	 under	 the	 rhetoric	 of	 modernity’s	
superiority	over	non-Europeans’	inferiority	(Grosfoguel,	2007).	
Third,	 coloniality	 is	 bound	 up	 with	 Eurocentric	 knowledge	 and	 the	
epistemicide	of	colonized	subjects’	knowledge.	The	concept	of	‘coloniality	of	
knowledge’	(Quijano,	2007)	refers	to	how	Eurocentric	knowledge	was	made	
globally	hegemonic	 through	 the	workings	of	 colonialism	and	capitalism.	 In	
this	manner,	Western	knowledge	was	considered	universally	salient—hence,	
the	 idea	 of	 ‘universality’	 of	 Eurocentric	 knowledge—while	 indigenous	 and	
other	 colonized	 subjects’	 knowledge	 was	 deemed	 to	 be	 provincial.3 	This	
epistemological	model,	explains	Quijano,	works	through	establishing	binary,	
hierarchical	 relations	 such	 as	 primitive	 versus	 civilized,	 irrational	 versus	


















different	 ways	 of	 knowing	 and	 being	 in	 the	 world	 (Mignolo,	 2007).	 As	
Mignolo	explains:	
Decoloniality,	 then,	 means	 working	 toward	 a	 vision	 of	 human	 life	
that	is	not	dependent	upon	or	structured	by	the	forced	imposition	of	
one	 ideal	 of	 society	 over	 those	 that	 differ,	 which	 is	 what	
modernity/coloniality	does	and,	hence,	where	decolonization	of	the	
mind	 should	 begin.	 The	 struggle	 is	 for	 changing	 the	 terms	 in	
addition	to	the	content	of	the	conversation.	(p.	459)	
Recognizing	 the	 consequences	of	 coloniality	 of	 knowledge	 and	 the	need	 to	
delink	 knowledge	 production	 from	 the	 colonial	matrix	 of	 power	 highlights	
that	epistemic	hierarchies	are	entangled	with	political,	economic,	and	ethical	
hierarchies.	Therefore,	a	decolonial	conceptualization	of	ethics	constitutes	an	




philosophy,	 and	 in	 the	 concrete	 projects	 of	 democracy-building	 that	 have	
been	 informed	 by	 them”	 (p.	 282).	 For	 example,	 the	 universalism	 that	 was	
proclaimed	 for	 humanity	 was	 distorted,	 as	 it	 was	 imposed	 through	 deeply	
racist	 and	 colonial	 discourses	 and	 practices	 such	 as	 the	 imposition	 of	









problematize	 Eurocentric	 understandings	 of	 peace	 and	 human	 rights	
theories	and	pedagogies.	My	goal	is	not	to	provide	a	comprehensive	review	of	
this	work,	but	rather	to	highlight	the	importance	of	paying	attention	to	how	







orientations.	 I	 will	 argue	 that	 if	 the	 reproduction	 of	 Western	 values	 and	









the	 concept	 of	 ‘human	 rights’	 itself	 and	 its	 grounding	 in	 liberal	 views	 of	
modernity	 and	 specifically	 humanist	 notions	 of	 ‘the	 human’	 as	 an	
autonomous,	rational,	and	sovereign	 ‘individual’	 (Donnelly,	2003;	Douzinas,	
2000;	 Mutua,	 2002).	 The	 very	 constitution	 of	 ‘human’	 in	 human	 rights	
discourses	 is	 predicated	 upon	 Eurocentric	 assumptions	 within	 which	 only	
particular	 kinds	 of	 ethical	 subjects	 are	 recognizable	 as	 ‘human,’	 while	 all	
others	 are	 excluded	 through	 racialization	 and	 colonization	 (Mignolo,	 2000;	
Wynter,	 2003).	 Pointing	 to	 the	 Eurocentric	 character	 of	 today’s	
conceptualizations	of	human	rights	reveals	their	epistemological,	ontological	
and	 ethical	 grounding,	 which	 “is	 the	 offspring	 of	 a	 particular	 perspective	
grounded	 in	 a	 historical	 and	 geographical	 context”	 (Barreto,	 2012,	 p.	 3).	
Today’s	conceptualizations	of	human	rights,	then,	have	colonizing	functions	
for	 those	 who	 have	 been,	 and	 still	 are,	 systematically	 excluded	 from	 its	
imaginary	(Khoja-Moolji,	2017).	
In	particular,	liberal	theories	of	politics	and	ethics—which	often	take	
the	 form	 of	 moral	 cosmopolitan	 and	 multicultural	 views	 in	 human	 rights	
discourses—are	based	on	the	idea	that	all	human	beings	belong	to	the	same	
collectivity	 and	 should	 be	 treated	 equally	 regardless	 of	 their	 nationality,	











cosmopolitanism,	 López	 points	 out,	 are	 individualism,	 universal	 equality,	
and	 the	 generality	 of	 application,	 while	 multiculturalism	 emphasizes	 the	
consideration	and	respect	of	difference.	And	yet,	as	the	history	of	colonialism	
shows,	the	ethico-political	grounding	of	liberal	theories	is	tied	to	the	project	
of	 coloniality	 and	 the	 reproduction	 of	 the	 colonial	matrix	 of	 power.	What	
seems	 to	be	missing	 from	 liberal	 theories	 is	how	modernity	and	coloniality	
have	 been	 responsible	 for	 the	 persistent	 coloniality	 and	 structural	
inequalities	in	the	world	today	(Dunford,	2017).	
A	similar	argument	has	been	made	about	HRE,	namely,	how	the	field	
has	 been	 shaped	 within	 the	 epistemological,	 ontological	 and	 ethical	
conditions	of	coloniality	that	have	delimited	its	own	space,	both	theoretically	
and	practically	(Bajaj,	Cislaghi	&	Mackie,	2016;	Keet,	2015;	Osler,	2015;	Yang,	
2015,	 Zembylas,	 2017a,	 2017b;	 Zembylas	 &	 Keet,	 2019).	 Although	 there	 is	 a	
range	of	perspectives	in	relation	to	HRE,	it	is	generally	understood	as	both	a	
field	 of	 study	 and	 an	 area	 of	 social	 education	 that	 is	 concerned	 with	 the	
teaching	and	 learning	of	human	 rights.	The	historical	development	of	HRE	
itself	 as	 a	 field	 has	 been	 linked	 to	 liberal,	 cosmopolitan	 and	multicultural	
perspectives	that	invoke	the	fundamental	epistemological	and	ethical	stance	
of	the	West—that	 it	can	unilaterally	know	and	determine	the	right	and	the	
true	 for	 itself	 and	 all	 others	 through	 educational,	 political	 and	 cultural	
interventions	 (Fregoso	 Bailón	 &	 De	 Lissovoy,	 2018).	 For	 example,	 the	
underlying	 assumption	of	many	 conventional	HRE	programs	 that	primarily	
promote	knowledge	about	universal	human	rights	 is	 that	 learning	about	or	
from	 universal	 human	 rights	 is	 a	 major	 way	 to	 secure	 ‘development’	 and	
‘emancipation’	in	‘developing’	countries;	alternative	conceptions	from	Africa	
or	 other	 indigenous	 populations	 of	 what	 it	 means	 to	 be	 ‘human’	 to	 live	 a	
meaningful	 life	 —e.g.	 humanity	 in	 relational	 terms;	 the	 inclusion	 of	
nonhumans	 in	 systems	 of	 living—are	 systematically	 undermined	 or	
completely	erased	from	these	programs	(Khoja-Moolji,	2017).	
																																								 																																								 																																								 								
	
	







There	 is	 now	 growing	 evidence	 that	 conventional	 HRE	 projects	 in	
schools,	 universities,	 non-governmental	 organisations	 and	 communities	
seldom	 question	 the	 epistemological	 and	 ontological	 underpinnings	 of	 the	
Eurocentric	 theory	of	human	 rights	 (Keet,	 2014),	perpetuating	an	uncritical	
advancement	 of	 human	 rights	 universals	 as	 an	 uncontested	 social	 good	
(Keet,	2015).	Building	on	Keet’s	argument	about	the	‘imprisonment’	of	human	
rights	 and	HRE	 into	 colonial	 and	neoliberal	 arrangements	 (see	 also	Coysh,	
2014;	Zembylas	&	Keet,	2019),	I	would	go	a	step	further	and	suggest	that	it	is	
time	 we	 questioned	 the	 ethical	 underpinnings	 of	 HRE	 as	 well,	 and	
specifically	how	its	liberal	framework	has	limited	the	ethical	promise	of	HRE	
within	 a	 normative	 frame.	 But	 before	 I	 make	 an	 attempt	 to	 do	 so,	 it	 is	
important	to	show	how	PE	has	followed	a	similar	trajectory	when	it	comes	to	
its	embeddedness	in	Eurocentric	ethical	theories	and	pedagogies.	
Similar	 to	HRE,	PE	 is	defined	as	both	a	 field	of	study	and	an	area	of	
social	education	that	is	concerned	with	war,	conflict	and	violence,	and	with	
how	 to	 promote	 peace	 in	 the	 world	 (Burns	 &	 Aspeslagh,	 1996;	 Harris	 &	
Morrison,	2003;	Salomon	&	Nevo,	2002).	There	are	clearly	overlaps	between	





(Bajaj,	 2015;	 Bajaj	 &	 Brantmeier,	 2011;	 Kester,	 2019;	 Shirazi,	 2011;	 Williams,	
2013,	2016,	2017;	Zakharia	2017;	Zembylas,	2018).	In	particular,	these	critiques	
highlight	 the	 limitations	 of	 the	 Eurocentric	 modernist	 framework	
undergirding	 peace	 pedagogies	 and	 essentially	 the	 reproduction	 of	
peacebuilding	 practices	 and	 institutions	 grounded	 in	whiteness,	 coloniality	
and	 liberalism.	 Similar	 to	 HRE,	 liberal	 theories	 in	 PE	 are	 reflected	 in	 the	
epistemological,	 political	 and	 ontological	 premises	 of	 peace	 and	 peace	
education	(Zembylas	&	Bekerman,	2013,	2017).	
Importantly,	there	are	growing	efforts	in	PE	to	utilize	more	explicitly	
ideas	 from	 decolonial	 theory	 to	 discuss	 and	 analyze	 understandings	 and	








form	 of	 questioning	 the	 colonial	 histories	 and	 iterations	 of	 structural	
violence	found	in	specific	teaching	and	learning	contexts	in	which	‘peace’	is	
invoked.	A	similar	argument	has	been	put	forward	by	Sumida	Huaman	(2011)	
who	 makes	 a	 link	 between	 ‘critical	 peace	 education’	 and	 ‘Indigenous	
education’	 by	 suggesting	 that	 it	 is	 important	 to	 recognize	 the	 legacies	 of	
colonization	 in	 Indigenous	 societies	 and	 the	 need	 to	 include	 Indigenous	
knowledges	 in	 nurturing	 transformative	 agencies	 toward	 critical	 peace	
education.	 In	 my	 own	 recent	 work,	 I	 have	 also	 brought	 into	 conversation	
‘postcolonial	 peace	 education’	 with	 ‘critical	 peace	 education’,	 making	 an	
attempt	 to	 theorize	 their	 convergences	 and	 divergences	 (Zembylas,	 2018).	
Other	scholars’	efforts	 in	peace	education	(e.g.	Shirazi,	2011;	Zakharia,	2017)	
also	 explore	 the	 linkages	 between	 postcolonial	 theory	 and	 critical	 peace	
education	to	articulate	what	 it	means	for	peace	education	to	be	inspired	by	
‘postcolonial’	ideas.5	
Although	 these	 efforts	 do	 move	 away	 from	 the	 influence	 of	
Eurocentric	 theorizing	 and	 engage	 explicitly	 with	 the	 ways	 in	 which	
philosophical	 understandings	 and	pedagogical	 practices	 of	 peace	 education	
are	 implicated	 in	modernity	and	coloniality,	 there	 is	still	considerable	work	
to	be	done	to	specify	and	unpack	the	ethical	contours	of	decolonizing	efforts	
in	PE.	Clearly,	work	in	‘critical	peace	education’	has	paid	attention	to	issues	






5 It	 is	 beyond	 the	 scope	 of	 this	 article	 to	 discuss	 the	 variety	 of	 understandings	 and	
definitions	 around	 ‘critical	 peace	 education,’	 ‘postcolonial	 peace	 education’	 and	 related	
notions.	 It	 is	sufficient	here	to	say	that	what	differentiates	 ‘conventional’	PE	from	critical	
peace	 education	 is	 that	 the	 latter	 brings	 in	 theoretical	 frameworks	 and	 conceptual	
resources	that	draw	from	fields	such	as	critical	pedagogy,	social	 justice	education,	critical	
race	 theory,	 and	 post-colonial	 and	 post-structural	 theory	 (e.g.	 see	 Bajaj,	 2015;	 Bajaj	 &	









problematic	as	 they	 feature	 strongly	 in	colonial	and	universalist	discourses.	
Hence,	 a	 decolonial	 conceptualization	 of	 ethics	 is	 not	 yet	 reflected	 in	
theorizations	of	critical	peace	education.	
In	particular,	 I	would	argue	 that	 it	 is	 important	 to	develop	a	critical	
decolonial	 ethics	 in	both	PE	and	HRE—that	is,	an	ethics	which	is	viewed	as	




theories	 that	 are	 not	 calling	 for	 the	 total	 dismantling	 of	 Eurocentric	




All	 in	 all,	 a	 decolonial	 perspective	 on	 ethics	 in	 HRE	 and	 PE	 poses	
fundamental	 questions	 such	 as:	 How	 can	 the	 experience	 of	 the	 colonial	
wound	 be	 acknowledged	 in	 HRE	 and	 PE	 accounts?	 What	 alternatives	 to	
Eurocentric	ethical	theories	may	be	developed	in	HRE	and	PE?	How	does	a	
decolonial	 perspective	 on	 ethics	 in	 HRE	 and	 PE	 radicalize	 liberal,	








	 This	 section	 explores	 the	 insights	 on	 decolonial	 ethics	 of	 three	
prominent	scholars	who	have	addressed	the	issue	of	ethics	more	explicitly	in	
their	writings:	Enrique	Dussel,	Sylvia	Wynter	and	Nelson	Maldonado-Torres.	
I	 focus	 on	 these	 scholars	 because	 they	 address	 issues	 that	 I	 find	 to	 be	
pertinent	 in	 the	 fields	 of	 HRE	 and	 PE,	 namely,	 the	 idea	 of	 ethics	 of	







of	war.	All	of	 these	 issues	come	up,	one	way	or	another,	 in	theorizations	of	
HRE	 and	 PE,	 although	 the	 sort	 of	 complexity	 invoked	 by	 these	 decolonial	
thinkers	 is	 not	 yet	 widely	 reflected	 in	 discussions	 of	 coloniality,	
hierarchization	and	marginalization	in	HRE	and	PE.	My	analysis	here,	then,	
draws	 attention	 to	 these	 issues	 to	 expose	 the	 importance	 of	 the	 ethical	 in	
attempts	to	decolonize	HRE	and	PE.	
In	 his	 long-standing	 work	 on	 the	 ethics	 of	 liberation,	 Dussel	 (1985,	
2013)	 maintains	 that	 Western	 ethics	 are	 grounded	 in	 a	 disembodied	 and	
metaphysical	 humanity	 that	 disregards	 materiality,	 positionality	 and	
corporality.	 Therefore,	 he	 argues	 that	 corporality,	 positionality	 and	
materiality	 should	 be	 reinstated	 by	 taking	 into	 consideration	 the	
multidimensionality	 of	 life—e.g.	 cultural	 values,	 biological	 factors,	material	
factors	 etc.—and	how	each	of	 these	dimensions	 implies	 ethical	obligations.	
As	 López	 (2010)	 observes,	 Dussel	 develops	 a	 critique	 of	Western	 ethics	 by	
departing	from	the	abstract	modern	moralism	of	Kant	and	moving	toward	an	
ethics	 that	 takes	 seriously	 the	 materiality	 of	 human	 life:	 “He	 [Dussel]	
maintains	that	an	ethics	that	attempts	to	deal	with	evidently	factual	matters	
such	as	misery	 and	 the	 conditions	of	 those	 excluded	 from	 the	global	 order	
necessarily	requires	the	primacy	of	a	material	order”	(p.	666).	
In	other	words,	 confronting	 the	materiality	of	 coloniality	demands	a	
decolonial	 ethics	 that	positions	 the	others	 (e.g.	 the	poor,	 the	oppressed)	 in	
practical-material	 terms;	 that	 is,	 the	 ethical	 responsibility	 to	 confront	 the	
affective	and	material	consequences	of	coloniality	(e.g.	see	Pedwell,	2016)	 is	
foregrounded.	As	Dussel	explains,	the	true	ethical	response	is	not	an	issue	of	
applying	 an	 ideal	 ethical	 system	 that	 dictates	 how	 one	 ought	 to	 act,	 but	
rather	 it	 is	 formulated	 on	 the	 basis	 of	 the	 other’s	 affective	 and	 material	
experiences	and	assessments	of	political	conditions:	
Others	 reveal	 themselves	 as	 others	 in	 all	 the	 acuteness	 of	 their	
exteriority	when	 they	 burst	 in	 upon	us	 as	 something	 extremely	 distinct,	 as	









The	ethical	moment	 is	 the	cry	 that	people	ought	 not	 to	be	poor	and	
oppressed;	 the	 materiality,	 positionality	 and	 corporality	 of	 this	 moment	 is	
precisely	 what	 disturbs	 the	 world	 and	 its	 colonial	 organization	 and	
reconceptualizes	 life	on	 the	basis	of	 the	gaze	of	 the	other.	 Importantly,	 the	
ethics	 of	 materiality,	 positionality	 and	 corporality	 extends	 well	 beyond	
particular	 persons	 encountering	 each	 other	 to	 encompass	 the	 social,	
historical	and	physical	environment	(De	Lissovoy,	2018).	
Like	Dussel,	 Sylvia	Wynter	 emerges	 as	 another	 unrelenting	 critic	 of	
the	Eurocentric	ethical	 foundations	by	 focusing	specifically	on	one	 figure—
white	European	‘Man’	as	a	rational,	masterful	and	civilized	being—and	how	
he	has	monopolized	 the	human	 (Odysseos,	 2017).	Wynter	 (2003;	Wynter	&	
McKittrick,	2015)	highlights	how	the	organization	of	colonial	discourses	and	
practices	entailed	 the	assumption	of	human	as	a	 single	homogenized	being	
based	 on	 the	 figure	 of	 the	 West’s	 liberal	 Man.	 For	 Wynter	 (2003),	 Man	
emerged	 through	 ‘genres’	 that	 occurred	 through	 historical	 ruptures	 in	
European	history—e.g.	the	homo	politicus	Man	of	the	Enlightenment	in	the	
eighteenth	 century	 or	 the	 homo	 economicus	 Man	 of	 capitalism	 in	 the	
nineteenth	century.	Her	genealogy	of	genres	of	Man	shows	how	knowledge	
systems,	values	and	ethics	are	embodied	and	historically	situated.	However,	
these	 ethical	 principles	 (e.g.	 White	 rationality,	 Christian	 principles	 of	
spirituality,	 etc.)	 have	 become	 normalized,	 while	 other	 ethics	 (e.g.	
Indigenous	 populations)	 have	 been	 undermined	 or	 excluded	 from	 the	
prevailing	genre	of	the	human.6		
For	Wynter,	challenging	the	overrepresented	figure	of	Man	is	“central	
to	 ethical	 inquiry	 and	 subjectivity,	 in	 situ	 at	 the	 multiple	 sites	 of	
contemporary	coloniality”	(Odysseos,	2017,	p.	458).	In	other	words,	Wynter’s	





6 As	noted	earlier,	 Indigenous	populations	are	not	homogeneous	 in	 their	 religion	or	even	
value	 systems.	 It’s	 the	 imposition	 of	 this	 unified	 /	 universal	 values	 that	 is	 problematic.	











(2015)	 explains:	 “Being	 human	 [for	Wynter]	 signals	 not	 a	 noun	 but	 a	 verb.	
Being	human	 is	a	praxis	of	humanness”	 (p.	3).	 It	 is	 important	 to	 show	how	
human	 selves	 are	 multifarious	 and	 are	 enacted	 differently	 in	 various	
(colonized)	 contexts;	 therefore,	 an	 important	 part	 of	 developing	 decolonial	
ethics,	Wynter	tells	us,	ought	to	be	the	de-generalization	of	the	Man	and	his	
universal	ethics.	
Finally,	 I	 turn	 to	 decolonial	 theorist	 Maldonado-Torres	 and	 his	
ground-breaking	book	Against	War:	 View	 from	 the	 Underside	 of	Modernity	
(2008)	 in	 which	 he	 articulates	 critical	 decolonial	 ethics	 in	 relation	 to	 the	
paradigm	 of	 war	 and	 racism	 that	 is	 inextricably	 tied	 to	 coloniality.	 A	
paradigm	 of	 war	 is	 defined	 by	 Maldonado-Torres	 as	 “a	 way	 of	 conceiving	
humanity,	knowledge,	and	social	relations	that	privileges	conflict	or	polemos”	
(p.	 3).	 This	 paradigm	 is	 genealogically	 traceable	 to	 the	 emergence	 of	
Eurocentric	modernity	 in	 1492,	which	 is	 interpreted	 as	 paradigmatic	 of	 the	
birth	of	a	world	capitalist	economy,	the	colonial	exploitation	by	Europe,	and	
the	 use	 of	 violence	 to	 impose	 a	 modern	 subjectivity	 based	 on	 race	 as	 an	
organizing	principle.	Decolonial	ethics,	then,	is	opposed	to	this	world	system	
and	the	ethics	 it	 invokes:	racially	hierarchized,	capitalist,	patriarchal,	sexist,	








According	 to	 Maldonado-Torres,	 the	 post-1492	 modern	 world-system	 was	








of	 decolonial	 liberatory	 ethics	 [and]	 marks	 a	 radical	 humanistic-oriented	
departure	 from	the	paradigm	of	war”	 (Ndlovu-Gatsheni,	 2014,	p.	910).	 If	we	




To	 sum	 up,	 the	 elements	 that	 each	 decolonial	 thinker	 adds—i.e.	 an	
ethics	 of	 materiality,	 positionality	 and	 corporality,	 the	 critique	 of	 ethical	
subjectivity	found	in	European	epistemes,	and	the	critique	of	the	Eurocentric	
paradigm	 of	 war	 —contribute	 toward	 a	 decolonial	 ethics	 that	 aims	 at	
rehumanizing	people	who	have	been	 reduced	by	 racism	and	colonialism	 to	
the	 ‘wretched	 of	 the	 earth’	 (Fanon,	 1963).	 Given	 that	 coloniality	 has	 been	
imposed	 on	 notions	 of	 universality,	 it	 might	 be	 tempting	 to	 think	 that	
decolonial	ethics	would	reject	any	global	design	of	ethics	“on	the	basis	that	it	
will	inevitably	crush	differences	and	reinforce	coloniality”	(Dunford,	2017,	p.	
387).	 Indeed,	 as	 De	 Lissovoy	 (2010)	 also	 points	 out,	 there	 are	 serious	
concerns,	 when	 claims	 are	 made	 about	 a	 global	 decolonial	 ethics.	 Such	
concerns	 emerge	 from	 the	 fact	 that	 notions	 of	 unity	 and	 commonality	 in	
ethical	 projects	 “have	 been	 infected	 by	 the	 assimilative	 impulse	 of	
Eurocentrism”	 and	 so	 it	 may	 be	 argued	 that	 “any	 truly	 global	 ethics	 [of	
decoloniality]	 will	 have	 to	 break	 with	 the	 epistemologically	 predatory	






globally	 minded	 ethics	 has	 to	 be	 built	 outside	 of	 Western	 traditions	 and	
should	be	an	ongoing	and	provisional	product	of	dialogue	and	collaboration	
between	differences	rather	than	an	a	priori	set	of	European	ethical	values	(De	











	 In	 this	 last	 section	 of	 the	 article,	 I	 explore	 how	 the	 decolonial	
reflections	on	ethics	outlined	so	far	may	sketch	a	different	trajectory	in	HRE	
and	 PE—one	 that	 moves	 beyond	 familiar	 ethical	 theories	 of	 liberal,	
multiculturalist,	and	cosmopolitan	orientations.	In	particular,	I	will	focus	on	
three	 ideas	 that	 invoke	new	 forms	of	HRE	 and	PE	 as	 ethical	 and	 incessant	
decolonial	 projects:	 border	 thinking,	 being	 human	 as	 praxis,	 and	
pluriversality.	 These	 ideas	 are	 inspired	 by	 the	 insights	 discussed	 from	 the	
work	of	Dussel,	Wynter	and	Maldonado-Torres.	Once	again,	these	ideas	are	
not	meant	to	be	exhaustive	or	even	exemplary	of	a	decolonial	global	ethics	in	




	 As	 noted	 earlier,	 liberal,	multiculturalist,	 and	 cosmopolitan	 theories	
promote	 thinking	 in	 abstract	 universalist	 terms,	 while	 ignoring	 the	
positionality	 and	 contribution	 of	 the	 poor	 and	 the	marginalized	 (Dunford,	
2017).	On	the	contrary,	decolonial	scholars	invoke	thinking	from	the	border	
to	highlight	the	contributions	of	subaltern	knowledge	producers,	who	are	in	
the	 margins,	 yet	 whose	 positions	 are	 legitimate	 to	 be	 heard	 (Maldonado-
Torres,	 2008).	 As	Maldonado-Torres	 writes,	 these	 positions	must	 be	 taken	
into	 consideration	 not	 because	 they	 have	 equal	 value	 in	 the	 name	 of	 an	
abstract	 cosmopolitanism,	 “but	 because	 the	 centuries	 old	 experience	 of	
coloniality	and	dehumanization	provides	colonized	subjects	with	 important	
perspectives”	 (p.	 250).	 Border	 thinking,	 then,	 does	 not	 assume	 that	 those	
positions	 will	 remain	 at	 the	 border	 and	 margins.	 It	 means	 that	 those	
positions	 are	 reacting	 to	 the	 dominant	 Eurocentric	 discourse,	 rather	 than	
being	 the	 core	and	 leading	 the	way	 forward	 to	decoloniality.	Also,	 it	 is	not	
only	 the	positions	 that	 are	brought	 in,	 but	 also	 the	 experiences	 of	 struggle	
and	praxis.	
Thinking	 from	 the	 borders	 in	 HRE	 and	 PE	 involves	 giving	 up	 the	
supremacy	 of	 liberal,	 multicultural	 or	 cosmopolitan	 ethics	 embedded	 in	






hierarchization	 and	 oppression	 in	 peacebuilding	 and	 human	 rights	 efforts.	
For	 example,	 to	 think	 from	 the	 borders	 implies	 decolonizing	HRE	 and	 PE	
interventions	 so	 that	 the	 histories	 and	 experiences	 of	 colonized	 people	 are	
included	 and	 active	 engagement	 with	 subjugated	 knowledges	 is	 invoked—
e.g.	the	recognition	of	colonized	people’s	experiences	of	peace	and	war	(see	
Zakharia,	2017).	Developing	a	decolonial	ethics	in	HRE	and	PE	means	making	
subjugated	 knowledges	 key	 points	 at	 the	 levels	 of	 pedagogy,	 curriculum	
programs,	 and	 teacher	 education,	while	 rejecting	Eurocentric	 supremacy	 in	
determining	what	legitimate	knowledge	is.		
Furthermore,	 to	 think	 from	 the	 borders	 is	 not	 only	 to	 acknowledge	
the	 experience	of	 the	 colonial	wound	 in	HRE	and	PE	 accounts,	 but	 also	 to	
think	 with	 these	 experiences	 of	 coloniality	 and	 dehumanization	 when	
developing	contextualized	HRE	and	PE	programs.	This	means	that	decolonial	
ethics	 radicalizes	 liberal,	 cosmopolitan,	 and	multiculturalist	 considerations	
of	difference	embedded	in	HRE	and	PE	programs,	because	it	offers	different	
understandings	of	what	 is	of	 fundamental	moral	 significance.	There	are	 for	
instance,	 indigenous	 cultures	 that	 do	 not	 prioritize	 the	 ‘rights’	 and	 moral	
worth	 of	 human	 beings	 as	 compared	 to	 other	 beings.	 Some	 of	 the	 moral	
visions	 that	 operate	 at	 the	 borders,	 then,	 refuse	 to	 specify	 in	 advance	 that	
some	beings	are	more	worthy	than	others	(Dunford,	2017).	The	recognition	of	





‘being	 human	 as	 praxis’	 “renews	 the	 question	 of	 ethics	 and	 shows	 that	 the	
modern	 colonial	 stabilization	 of	 knowledge	 about	 who	 we	 are	 as	 human	
cannot	function	as	a	foundation	for	a	revisioned	humanism	or	for	decolonial	
ethics”	 (Odysseos,	 2017,	p.	458).	De-generalizing	 the	 figure	of	Man	 through	
the	development	of	a	decolonizing	HRE	and	PE	would	entail	efforts	towards	
new	forms	of	education	that	raise,	much	like	decolonial	ethics,	fundamental	







challenge	 knowledge	 orders	 that	 continue	 to	 do	 epistemic,	 and	 legitimate	
actual,	violence?”	(Odysseos,	2017,	p.	466).	In	this	sense,	forms	of	education	






of	 epistemic	 injustice	 in	 all	 educational	 contexts,	 theories,	 policies	 and	
pedagogical	 practices	 (Zembylas,	 2017b).	 If	 Wynter’s	 work	 on	 human	 as	
praxis	 teaches	 us	 anything,	 argues	 Odysseos	 (2017),	 it	 is	 that	 grasping	 the	
multiplicity	of	humanity,	as	manifested	in	different	contexts,	can	only	result	
in	 the	 dissolution	 of	 disciplinary	 boundaries	 and	 an	 obsolescence	 of	 the	
disciplines	 as	 narrowly	 conceived	 in	 Eurocentric	 domains	 of	 knowledge	 (p.	
469).	To	put	 this	simply:	HRE	and	PE	need	to	cease	 to	exist	as	Eurocentric	
disciplines	 and	 dissolve	 the	 disciplinary	 boundaries,	 and	 begin	 to	 employ	
practices	 of	 knowledge	 and	 language	 that	 seek	 to	 develop	 radical	 and	
transgressive	 praxis,	 which	 sees	 the	 world	 as	 relation	 rather	 than	 in	
individualist	terms.	
The	 ‘renewal’	 of	 HRE	 and	 PE,	 then,	 is	 inextricably	 linked	 to	
knowledge-production	and	cultivation	as	participation	in	practices	that	aim	
to	make	possible	and	viable	the	existence	of	new	ethical	relations	with	others	
(humans	 and	 non-humans	 alike)	 and	 engage	 in	 ongoing	 struggles	 for	
decolonization.	 HRE	 and	 PE	 as	 knowledge	 practices	 are	 not	 isolated	 from	
decolonization	 efforts;	 on	 the	 contrary,	 to	 insist	 on	 renewing	 these	 fields,	
academically,	ethically,	politically,	and	practically	means	radical	institutional,	
epistemic	 and	 ethical	 reforms	 that	 erase	 existing	 colonial	 remnants	 of	
knowledge	in	all	manifestations	of	what	is	called	HRE	and	PE.	To	enable	this	
radical	 renewal	 of	 HRE	 and	 PE,	 then,	 our	 conceptualizations	 of	 ‘human	











is,	 values	which	 emerge	 from	dialogue	 across	multiple	 places,	 cultures	 and	
visions	about	the	world	(Dussel,	2013;	Mignolo,	2011).	There	are	overlaps	and	
distinctions	 between	 border	 thinking	 and	 pluriversality,	 however,	 they	 are	
complementary	 ideas.	 While	 the	 former	 focuses	 on	 the	 notion	 of	 taking	
seriously	as	producers	of	knowledge	those	shunned	by	coloniality,	the	latter	






discussion,	 performance,	 ceremony)	 and	 if	 conducted	with	 respect,	 then	 it	
can	 foster	 commonality	 and	 values	 that	 have	 global	 significance	 “not	 by	
virtue	 of	 an	 already-existing	 universality	 that	 can	 be	 articulated	 from	 one	
particular	place,	but	on	 the	basis	of	 resonances	amongst,	 translation	across	
and	 the	 construction	 of	 common	 understandings	 amongst	 multiple	
positions”	(p.	390).	For	example,	Mignolo	(2011)	has	talked	about	the	need	to	
pluriversalize	 human	 rights,	 namely,	 to	 recognize	 that	 there	 are	 plural	
principles	of	human	rights	across	all	 cultures	 rather	 than	only	 the	Western	
ones.	 That	 Western	 epistemology	 appears	 universalistic	 compared	 to	
epistemologies	of	the	South	is	because	Western	conceptions	of	human	rights	
are	 part	 of	 the	 imperial	 and	 colonial	 project.	 Respectful	 intercultural	
translation	 across	 cultures	 that	 have	 different	 understandings	 and	
experiences	 of	 ‘human	 rights’	 can	 be	 used	 as	 valuable	 tools	 to	 develop	 a	
critical	and	interpretative	approach	to	HRE	that	could	pluriversalise	human	
rights	(Zembylas,	2017b).	To	pluriversalize	human	rights,	human	rights	need	
to	 be	 historicized,	 that	 is,	 the	 history	 of	 rights	 has	 to	 extend	 to	 other	
geographies	 and	 historical	 thinkers	who	 approach	 rights	 from	 perspectives	
beyond	Europe	(i.e.	Third	World,	South,	indigenous).	
Furthermore,	pluriversalizing	HRE	and	PE	means	turning	the	process	






pluriversal	 HRE	 or	 PE,	 therefore,	 is	 conceived	 as	 a	 process	 of	 advancing	
epistemic	 justice	 by	 delinking	 human	 rights	 teaching	 or	 peace	 pedagogies	
from	Eurocentrism;	similar	to	border	thinking,	pluriversalizing	HRE	and	PE	





and	 symbolic	 negations	 and	 losses	 as	 a	 result	 of	 colonialism	 and	
contemporary	 forms	 of	 dispossession,	 domination	 and	 epistemicide	
grounded	in	the	daily	life	(cf.	Dussel,	2013).		
Needless	 to	 say,	 developing	 a	 decolonial	 ethics—in	 HRE,	 PE	 or	
elsewhere—that	 is	 grounded	 in	 pluriversality	 is	 not	 without	 its	 risks	 and	









As	 Dunford	 suggests,	 without	 any	 reflection	 on	 the	 emergence	 of	
pluriversality	 within	 specific	 contexts	 that	 examine	 the	 compatibility	 of	
practices,	 worldviews,	 values	 or	 policies,	 then	 there	 is	 a	 risk	 to	 turn	
pluriversality	 into	 another	 abstract,	 universal	 principle	 that	 would	





7	‘Intercultural	 dialogue’	 is	 a	 concept	 championed	 by	 the	 Council	 of	 Europe	 and	 other	
intergovernmental	organizations	and	many	programs	are	created	around	this	concept	 for	
young	 people	 and	 different	 communities;	 however,	 all	 of	 these	 initiatives	 often	 fail	 to	







A	 major	 tension	 emerging	 from	 attempts	 to	 develop	 a	 decolonial	






rest	 are	 also	 options”	 (p.	 21).	 This	 implies	 that	 liberal,	 multicultural	 and	
cosmopolitan	 ethical	 theories	 are	 not	 rejected,	 as	 long	 as	 they	 are	 also	
presented	as	options	rather	than	imperatives.		
On	 the	 other	 hand,	 if	 decolonial	 ethics	 is	 to	 provide	 an	 alternative	
that	 truly	dismantles	 the	colonial	matrix	of	power,	 then	 it	 is	 argued	 that	 it	
must	be	an	imperative	(Dunford,	2017).	Far	from	settling	the	issue	here,	my	





Advocating	 for	 the	 pluriversalisation	 of	 HRE	 and	 PE,	 then,	 has	 important	
implications	 for	 disciplinary	 formations	 and	 knowledge	 production,	
including	the	production	of	ethical	and	decolonial	theorizing	in	these	fields	
(cf.	 Odysseos,	 2017,	 p.	 471).	 As	 calls	 for	 decolonization	 grow	 in	 various	
academic	 fields,	 “we	 may	 choose	 to	 refuse	 these;	 or	 we	 might	 decide	 to	
strategically	 engage	 in	 the	 sort	 of	 pluralization	 of	 knowledge”	 (Odysseos,	
2017,	 p.	 471)	 discussed	 above,	 as	 part	 of	 a	 broader	 attempt	 to	 elaborate	 a	






PE	scholars	 seeking	ways	 to	 interrogate	and	disrupt	Eurocentric	knowledge	
production	in	these	fields.	This	article	has	suggested	that	an	important	task	







PE,	 while	 showing	 the	 limits	 of	 familiar	 ethical	 theories,	 namely,	 liberal,	
multiculturalist,	 and	 cosmopolitan	 ones.	 In	 light	 of	 the	 work	 of	 Dussel,	






coloniality	 of	 academic,	 institutions,	 disciplines	 and	 structures.	 The	 three	
directions	 outlined	 here	 help	 raise	 questions	 about	whether,	 how	 and	why	
policies,	 practices,	 programs,	 curricula,	 and	 theories	 in	 HRE	 and	 PE	 truly	
promote	epistemic	 justice.	 Insisting,	 then,	on	questions	of	decolonial	ethics	
illuminates	 not	 only	 the	 ethico-political	 elements	 of	HRE	 and	 PE,	 but	 also	
the	prospects	of	invoking	transformative	praxis	in	these	fields.	
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